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aBstraCt
This paper is about (i) our traditional resistance to feeling as constitutive of  the 
philosophical task, and (ii) the power of  aesthetics to enable ethics. It claims that 
feeling is necessary for meaning and value. It is argued, further, that aesthetic 
experience, and the aesthetic in general, have the power to wake us up from our usual 
existential sleep or numbness. Because the grammar of  aesthetic language involves 
self-exposure and self-commitment, we suggest, in rejecting the sensible, we may be 
disavowing the inevitable emotional engagement in all human communication and 
evading the difficulty of  the vulnerability necessary for the real task of  philosophy.
KEyWords: aesthetics, aesthetic experience, ethics, the task of  philosophy, 
existential sleep, emotional engagement, human communication.
rEsuMEn
Este artículo trata sobre (i) nuestra resistencia tradicional al sentimiento como 
constitutivo de la tarea filosófica; y (ii) sobre el poder de la estética para permitir 
la ética. Se afirma que el sentimiento es necesario para el significado y el valor. Se 
argumenta, además, que la experiencia estética, y la estética en general, tienen el poder 
de despertarnos de nuestro sueño o entumecimiento existencial habitual. Debido a 
que la gramática del lenguaje estético implica auto-exposición y auto-compromiso, 
sugerimos que al rechazar lo sensible, podemos estar rechazando el inevitable 
compromiso emocional en toda comunicación humana y evadiendo la dificultad de la 
vulnerabilidad necesaria para la verdadera tarea de la filosofía.
PaLaBras CLavE: estética, experiencia estética, ética, la tarea de la filosofía, sueño 
existencial, compromiso existencial, comunicación humana.
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PrELudE
Understanding a sentence is much more akin to 
understanding a theme in music that one may think.
(Wittgenstein (1968), §527)
The attitude we have in our academic culture towards aesthetics would make 
us think that it is something dangerous, especially because of  the way we keep 
it –sometimes subtly and sometimes openly – marginalized from the scope of  
serious discussion, demanding that it satisfy criteria of  validity and intellectual 
respectability that are alien to it, and ultimately alienating.
This attitude was present in the nineties in universities in the States, in their 
refusal to consider film, for instance, a legitimate object of  study. Asked what he 
thought was the reason behind that rejection, Stanley Cavell responded:
“[one] answer to why film is resisted as a serious subject of  study on the part 
of  proper universities is often, that people are afraid in such a context, of  the 
possibility of  the frivolous [or] of  their own pleasures, […] perhaps of  pleasures 
that seem to them low […].” (Conant (1989), p. 68)
The same resistance against the aesthetic lives on today -perhaps not so much 
anymore towards film, which in the last few decades has gradually attained some 
academic respectability- but towards popular culture in general. It too is often 
rejected as an object of  serious reflection, it seems, because of  the same threats 
Cavell mentions, of  shallowness and the implicit appeal to our passions. But, 
then as now, this attitude is, as Cavell put it, “merely philistine, intellectually and 
artistically indefensible.” (Conant (1989), p. 69)
1. aEsthEtiC PoWEr
Commenting on Shakespeare’s Tempest, Henry James (1988) wrote:
“[in] a masterpiece [the very act of  that transcendental conjunction that occurs 
[…] in the [artist], between […] his lucid experience […] and his aesthetic passion, 
becomes visible.” (p. 433).
That transcendental conjunction, as James calls it, of  lucidity and passion, 
is not exclusive, however, to the artistic creation. It is responsible, in general, for 
making things or events, people and actions important and morally relevant, able 
to define -or contribute to- the meaning of  our lives.
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Rainer Maria Rilke (1989) describes just such a moment in these lines from his 
poem Archaic Torso of  Apollo:
We cannot know his legendary head
With eyes like ripening fruit. And yet his torso
Is still suffused with brilliance from inside,
Like a lamp, in which his gaze, now turned to low,
gleams in all its power. Otherwise
the curved breast could not dazzle you so, nor could
a smile run through the placid hips and thighs
to that dark center where procreation flared.
Otherwise this stone would seem defaced
beneath the translucent cascade of  the shoulders
and would not glisten like a wild beast’s fur:
would not, from all the borders of  itself
burst like a star: for here there is no place
that does not see you. You must change your life. (p. 61)
From the lucidity of  an aesthetic experience, an intimate passion can suddenly 
illuminate one’s whole life, and stir the will with the need for change. Lucid 
experience and aesthetic passion, then, are elements of  moral awakening in life.
Dante’s (2012) account, in La Vita Nuova, of  his first vision of  Beatrice 
provides us with another example of  that awakening. He writes:
At that time, truly, I say, the vital spirit, which dwells in the innermost chamber of  
the heart, started to tremble so powerfully that its disturbance reached all the way 
to the slightest of  my pulses. And trembling it spoke these words: “Here is a god 
stronger than me; who will rule over me” (p. 3).
His experience insufflated by aesthetic passion got only gives rise, not only 
to a work of  art, but also becomes a guide of  life for Dante. Both cases bring to 
the fore something I would call the ethical power of  the aesthetic, its influence, in other 
words, in promoting an ethical stance towards things.
The aesthetic transforms our rational understanding into a creative power, 
capable of  infusing personal value and meaning to things. At its most elementary 
level the aesthetic makes us see things again, through feeling (delight or disgust, 
pleasure or displeasure, fear or awe, etc.) but it also draws an existential horizon 
from which our life can be grounded in our vital needs and desires. It transforms, 
in other words, the awareness of  the subject into an ethical awakening.
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The word ‘aesthetic’ comes from the Greek Αισθησι�, which means “sensible 
perception” and refers to the reception of  the world through the bodily senses. 
The prejudice against the aesthetic is present in the resistance we are considering 
here to the serious use, for instance, of  super-heroes and anti-heroes, celebrities 
like Madonna, Lady Gaga, or television series like Breaking Bad or Black Mirror, 
etc. The mere suggestion makes well established academics sometimes scowl.
That prejudice is a symptom of  the traditional impetus to repress the bodily 
and its emotional engagement in the search for knowledge. It is as if  we were 
convinced that “mere feeling,” as John McDowell (1983) has put it, “could not 
contribute an experience in which the world reveals itself  to us.” (p. 16) That 
conviction -as another critic points out- “is an expression of  the existential doubt 
that human beings can really get access to the world of  things, can ever be said to 
truly know and value them” (Petts (2000), p. 62) through feeling.
This marginalization of  the aesthetic is detrimental. It rips the ethical apart 
from experience, in order to define it instead with objective and rational arguments 
and ideologies. But, even worse, it threatens to make the world a foreign place, 
where it is eventually impossible to recognize or even find ourselves. Devoid of  
anything we can really feel as our own, disavowing our own interiority, we may 
begin to observe moral principles mechanically and to adopt attitudes that neither 
belong to us nor are faithful to ourselves.
2. KnoWing through FEELing
Now, knowing through feeling is not like knowing through the senses, which 
because they are common and shareable can ground our moral judgements. We 
can say to someone, “Touch this” (or smell or hear this) and -expecting the other’s 
understanding-, continue our conversation on the basis of  that common experience. 
But I can’t tell you to feel what I am feeling, and then continue our conversation with 
the same assurance. ‘Knowing through feeling’ is not a mode of  empirical, verifiable 
experience, that we can naturally go on to conceptualize or categorize intellectually. 
It is, rather, a mode of  (inner?) perception, that brings what we are experiencing into 
a field of  meaning, that not only makes it absolutely objective for us -something 
everybody would have to see (as Kant says of  Beauty, for example)- but also, and at the 
same time, something that is intimate to me. The claim of  knowledge it makes has 
the force of  any rational knowing. As Cavell (1985a) puts it:
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[F]eeling functions as a touchstone: the mark left on the stone is invisible to others, 
but the result is one of  knowledge, or has the form of  knowledge—it is directed to 
an object, the object has been tested, the result is one of  conviction.  This seems to 
me to suggest why one is anxious to communicate the experience of  such objects. 
It is not merely that I want to tell you how it is with me, how I feel, in order to 
find sympathy or to be left alone, or for any other of  the reasons for which one 
reveals one’s feelings. It’s rather that I want to tell you something I’ve seen, or 
heard, or realized, or come to understand, for the reasons for which such things are 
communicated (because it is news about a world we share, or could share). Only I 
find, that  I can’t tell you; and that makes it all the more urgent to tell you. I want 
to tell you because the knowledge, unshared, is a burden—not, perhaps, the way 
having a secret can be a burden, or being misunderstood; a little more like the way, 
perhaps, not being believed is a burden, or not being trusted. […] It matters, there 
is a burden, because unless I can tell what I know, there is a suggestion (to myself  
as well) that I do not know. But I do—what I see is that (pointing to the object). 
But for that to communicate, you have to see it too. (p. 193)
We build the bridge to make these experiences shareable, with our words. My 
language must lead the other to that knowledge. And this means that if  I want 
you to see what I see and share what I know, I will have to recreate for you -in my 
sentences and the experiences to which they appeal, in the words I stress, in their 
tempo, tone and rhythms even, in the associations they suggest, and the images 
they evoke- the same imaginative conditions under which I have experiences the 
object under the particular aspect I am trying to get you to see. A sentence as 
simple as: “Blue is the color of  consciousness when it is caressed” does that 
job. But perhaps more pertinently, the following example, from “A Matter of  
Meaning it,” where Cavell (1985b) is articulating his experience of  Anthony Caro’s 
sculptures, clearly exemplifies what I mean:
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Caro uses steel rods and beams and sheets which he does not work (e.g., bend or 
twist) but rather, one could say, places. I had thought that a piece of  sculpture had 
the coherence of  a natural object, that it was what I wish to call spatially closed or 
spatially continuous (or consisted of  a group of  objects of  such coherence); but 
a Caro may be open and discontinuous, one of  its parts not an outgrowth from 
another, nor even joined or connected with another so much as it is juxtaposed to 
it, or an inflection from it. I had thought a piece of  sculpture stood on a base (or 
crouched in  a pediment, etc.) and rose; but a Caro rests on the raw ground and 
some do not so much rise as spread or reach or open.
I had heard that sculpture used to be painted, and took it as a matter of  fashion 
or taste that it no longer was […]; Caro paints his pieces, but not only is this 
not an external or additional fact about them, it creates objects about which I 
wish to say they are not painted, or not colored: they have color not the way, say, 
cabinets or walls do, but the way grass and soil do […] It is almost as though the 
color helps de-materialize its supporting object. One might wish to say they are 
weightless, but that would not mean that these massively heavy materials seem 
light, but, more surprisingly, neither light nor heavy, resistant to the concept of  
weight altogether—as they are resistant to the concept of  size; they seem neither 
large nor small. […] They are no longer things. (pp. 217-218)
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3. aEsthEtiC uttEranCEs
The propositions which we utter to express this kind of  knowledge do not 
share the grammar of  constative propositions. Wittgenstein refers to them as 
expressive utterances (Äußerungen) and notes that these propositions are not 
intended to establish truths or represent facts. Their purpose is rather to establish 
a field of  meaning where intimacy and community can grow. As Wittgenstein 
(1980) puts it, “these expressions are reactions in which people find each other.” 
(§874)
Now, such an encounter and our ability, generally, to communicate with 
another, is dependent upon our finding some basic common ground in our 
understanding, in our natural reactions, in our words and gestures. It depends, 
as Wittgenstein (1980) would say, not upon our sharing beliefs and opinions, but 
primarily upon our mutual attunement in judgments, in form of  life. (cf. §§241-2).
But the risk involved in such an engagement is the risk of  failure, and failure 
despite, or in the midst of, our having made ourselves vulnerable to the other. 
Behind the resistance to the aesthetic may lurk not so much a justified demand 
for intellectual rigor, but a fear of  reaching our limits, the limits of  language, 
where, in Cavell’s (1979) words, we can “begin to feel, or ought to feel terrified 
that maybe language (and understanding, and knowledge) rests upon very shaky 
foundations –a thin net over an abyss” (p. 178). Or as Nietzsche writes, driving 
this point home:
“Behind every cave… there is, and must necessarily be, a still deeper cave: an 
ampler, stranger, richer world beyond the surface, an abyss behind every bottom, 
beneath every ‘foundation’” (Deleuze, G. and Rosalind Krauss (1983), p. 53).
In disavowing the aesthetic dimension of  experience, and refusing to engage 
with feeling, we avoid having to come face to face with the abyss, accept our 
permanent uncertainty, the opacity, unruliness and unpredictability of  the body, 
where words touch our connection to non-being, where in their limit we sense the 
real nature of  our finitude and mortality.
4. PhiLosoPhiCaL aWaKEning
Wittgenstein (2013) claims that the real difficulties in philosophy have to do 
not with the intellect but with the will. Most of  all what we need, as he says, is the 
“resignation of  feeling”, “a change of  attitude”:
Análisis. Revista de investigación filosófica, vol. 6, n.º 2 (2019): 187-196
Victor J. Krebs194
Work on philosophy is actually closer to working on oneself. On one’s own under-
standing. On the way one sees things, (And on what one demands of  them). (p. 300)
Philosophy becomes a task of  moral transformation, a search for intellectual 
integrity, putting thought and feeling together. Philosophy, Wittgenstein tells us, 
is “the battle against the bewitchment of  our intelligence,” i.e., a form of  therapy 
toward lucidity. It aims at an (ethical) awakening. Our traditional resistance to 
aesthetics, then, is of  a piece with the bewitchment of  language. Instead of  
awakening us, marginalizing the aesthetic, just sends us to sleep.
Rather than shunning the aesthetic, philosophy must integrate it, bringing it 
in, just as our words must descend from the thinness of  air of  metaphysics, to the 
everyday opaqueness of  the body, we must engage with our feeling and emotion. 
We must, in Wittgenstein’s (1980) own words, “turn our investigation 180º around 
the axis of  our real need” (§ 108).
I am not saying: if  such-and-such facts of  nature were different people would 
have different concepts (in the sense of  a hypothesis). But: if  anyone believes that 
certain concepts are absolutely the correct ones, and that having different ones 
would mean not realizing something that we realize –then let him imagine certain 
very general facts of  nature to be different from what we are used to, and the 
formation of  concepts different from the usual ones will become intelligible to 
him. (Wittgenstein (1980), II, xii)
In denying the emotional we are rejecting precisely this door towards 
awakening to the plurality and difference, the change and uncertainty that must 
come with our words when we start to hear them in the actual world, instead of  in 
the metaphysics outside our language games. We must radically change our attitude 
towards feeling and the body, attempt to engage with the world in that way, see it 
through those eyes to counter that dogmatism of  philosophy that can homogenize 
everything and abstract from the singularities of  the body. “Philosophical work”, 
Wittgenstein (2013) writes, “is actually more like work on oneself. About the way 
we see things. And what we expect from them.” (p. 300).
Coda
Let me end with these words from Wilde’s The Portrait of  Dorian Gray (1996), 
which gives us both a diagnosis of  our current situation, and a prognosis of  what 
this change would mean for us:
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The idolatry of  the senses has been frequently, and quite rightly, condemned, when 
men feel an instinctive and natural fear against passions and sensations stronger 
than themselves, and of  which they are aware that they share with less organized 
ways of  life. But it seemed to Dorian Gray that the true nature of  the senses 
had never been understood, and that they had remained wild and animal only 
because the world had been determined to subdue them by starvation or kill them 
by suffering, instead of  trying to make them elements of  a new spirituality, of  
which a fine instinct for beauty should be a dominant feature. (p. 98)
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